Corporate Earnings as Gains Profits and Income as Depending Upon the Time of Their Accrual by Drysdale, Robert M & McGiffin, Maurice C
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 16 Issue 4 
1918 
Corporate Earnings as Gains Profits and Income as Depending 
Upon the Time of Their Accrual 
Robert M. Drysdale 
Maurice C. McGiffin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert M. Drysdale & Maurice C. McGiffin, Corporate Earnings as Gains Profits and Income as Depending 
Upon the Time of Their Accrual, 16 MICH. L. REV. 232 (1918). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol16/iss4/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
CORPORATE EARNINGS AS "GAINS, PROFITS AND 
INCOME" AS DEPENDING UPON THE TIME 
OF THEIR ACCRUAL. 
T HE discussion here has to do with the earnings cf corporations as taxable income, whether such earnings remain in the hands 
of the corporation accumulating them, or are distributed to 
the stockholders as dividends, the inquiry being limited, however, 
to the question of the time of their accrual as affecting their tax-
ability. 
A number of late cases in the Federal Courts arising under the 
INCOME TAX AcT of October 3rd, 1913, have dealt with this sub-
ject. In all of these ca~es the specific point in issue was this: Are 
earnings of a corporation which accrued prior to the incidence of 
the income tax sought to be imposed, but paid to or received by 
another corporation or individual as dividends ::mbsequent thereto, 
taxable as income? On this prop.osition the several Federal Courts 
that have passed upon it are in hopeless conflict. In the late case of 
Lewellyn, Collector v. Gulf Oil Company/ the United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in overruling the District 
Court, holds that such income is taxable; and to the same effect are 
the late cases o£Towne v. Eisner, and Southern Pacific v. Lowe.2 
· The opposite, and as we believe, manifestly correct conclusion 
is arrived at in the recent cases of Lynch v. Hornby, 8 Lynch v. 
Turrish,8 and in the Gulf Oil Case, supra, in the District Court; 
and the same general view is taken in a number of cases construing 
earlier revenue laws.' 
As will be seen, the Act of September 8th, 1916, did much to 
clear up the confusion but it remained for Congress, by the amend-
ments to that Act introduced into the WAR INCOME AcT of October 
3rd, 1917, to fix definitely just what corporate assets are and are 
not taxable, (and if taxable to what extent), as income so far as 
their taxability is dependent upon the time of their accrual. The 
word "accrued" wherever used is to be taken in its usual and 
1 Lewellyn, Collector, v. Gulf Oil Corp (1917), .245 Fed. 1. 
~Towne v. Eisner (1917), .242 Fed. 702; Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe (1917), 
.238 Fed. 847. 
•Lynch v. Turrish (1916), .236 Fed. 653; Lynch v. Hornby, .236 Fed. 661; Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Lewellyn (1917), .24.2 Fed. 709. 
"Gray v. Darlington (1872), 15 Wall. (U. S.) 63; Bailey, Collector v. Railroad Co. 
(1882), 106 U. S. 109; Mitchell Brothers Co. v. Doyle, Collector (1915), .2.25 Fed. 437; 
Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. United States (1917), .242 Fed. 18. 
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ordinary legal meaning, that is as synonymous with the words 
"c:arned" or "accumulated". 
Under the express language of the law as it now is, we are unable 
to conceive how any court can again fall into the palpable error 
which we believe inheres in the Lowe, Eisner and Gulf Oil Cases. 
However, these cases and those in which an opposite conclusion 
was reached are significant as showing the necessity, in the interest 
.:>f uniformity in the administration of the Income Tax Law, for 
the changes in the law, and as emphasizing the state of the law as 
it is under the instant Acts. Starting with the leading case of 
Gray v. Darlington, which is the first one dealing with the point, we 
sr.all attempt to trace the genesis and development of the law to the 
present time. 
THE DOC'l'RINE O:&' GRAY v. D.ARLING'l'ON. 
Gray v. Darlington4 arose under the Civil Viar Income Tax Law. 
The facts. were that the plaintiff purchased bonds prior to the enact-
ment of the INCOME TAX Ac'£ of 1861. The bonds gradually increased 
in value during a period of years and were sold subsequent to the pas-
sage of the Act at a material gain. The question was whether or not 
the profit represented by this gradual increase in value was taxable as 
income for the year in which the bonds were sold. It was held that it 
was not. The Court speaking by Mr. Justice FIELD at p 65, said:-
"The advance in the value of property during a series of years can, 
in no just sense, be considered the gains, profits, or income of any one 
particular year of the series, although the entire amount of the ad-
vance be at one time turned into money by a sale of the property. 
The statute looks, with some exceptions, for subjects of taxation 
only to annual gains, profits, and income. 
* * * Mere advance in value in no sense constitutes the gains, 
profits, or income specified by the statute. It constitutes and can be 
treated merely as increase of capital. 
"The rule adopted by the officers of the revenue in the present 
case would justify them in treatinv as .irains of one year the increase 
in the value of property extending through any number of years, 
through even the entire century. The actual advance in value of 
property over its cost may, in fact, reach its height years before its 
sale; the value of the property may, in truth, be less at the time of 
the sale than at any previous period in ten years, yet, if the amount 
received exceed the actual cost of the property, the excess is to be 
treated, according to their views, as gains of the owner for the year 
in which the sale takes place. We are satisfied that no such result 
was intended by the statute". 5 
1 Supra, note 4. 
234 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Taking the decision literally it would seem that even that portion 
of the gain in value accruing during_ the taxable year was held not 
to be taxable income. However, the principle of Gray v. Darlington 
has been restricted in later cases to this e:>..1:ent, viz: that that por-
tion of the increase in value which accrued subsequent to the in-
cidence of the tax, is to be considered as taxable income.6 As thus 
confined the doctrine laid down in Gray v. Darlington has never 
been directly challenged but, as will later appear, the Lowe, Eisner 
and Gulf Oil Cases are in direct conflict with it. 
Bailey, Collector v. Railroad Co., also arose under the Civil War 
Income Tax Law and was a suit by the Railroad Company against 
·Bailey, Collector of Internal Revenue, to recover moneys which it 
claimed had been illegally exacted as income tax within the meaning 
of the law. The Act provided that certain corporations should be 
subject to and pay a tax on the amount of interest, etc., and upon 
"any dividend in scrip or money due or payable to its stockholders 
as part of the earnings, profits, income or gain of such company, 
and all profits of such company carried to the account of any fund 
or used for construction." The Company in 1868 declared a scrip 
dividend out of earnings accruing through the period from 1853 to 
1868. The Supreme Court of the United States held that there was 
no authority for the imposition of the tax upon so much of the 
earnings as accrued prior to 1862, the date from which the tax took 
e:ffect.6• The Court speaking by -Mr. Justice MATTHEWS, at p. n4, 
said:- "It should be borne in mind, in the first place, that the tax 
provided for in this section is an annual income tax, and its sub-
ject is the interest paid and profits earned by the company for each 
year, and year by year; and that both by the express letter of the 
law, and its necessary implications, the tax is not laid on any of 
these funds which came into being before the time prescribed in the 
act. And in the ordinary execution of the law, it was contemplated 
that the funds to be taxed, and the tax imposed upon them, would 
be concurrent, as to each fiscal year; the scheme of the statute being 
to levy the tax upon the income for the year ending on the 31st of 
December next preceding the assessment; and while it would be 
altogether admissible to go back, for the purpose of assessing a tax 
upon a proper fund which had accrued during a previous year and 
escaped taxation, nevertheless the tax imposed would be for the 
omitted year. But no tax, in contemplation of the law, accrues upon 
the fund, except for the year in which the fund itself accrued." 
•Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. United States, Supra, note 4 at p. 19. 
•• Supra, note 4. 
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CASES ARISING UNDER CORPORATION EXCISE TAX LAW OF 1909. 
i"'vfitclzell Bros. Company v. Doyle, Collector, was a case in which 
the property of a corporation consisted chiefly of timber lands and 
a saw mill, and its business, the manufacture and sale of lumber. 
Held, that for the purpose of its return under the CORPORATION Ex-
CISE TAX ACT it was entitled to deduct from its gross receipts as 
capital assets a sum at least equal to the market value, at the time 
the Act went into effect, of the standing timber from which the 
lumber sold during the year was manufactured, although such timber 
was bought years before at a smaller price; and it was also entitled 
to deduct as capital assets any amount received from the sale of 
cut-over or other lands sold during the year, not exceeding their 
market value at the time the law went into effect. The Court in 
arriving at this conclusion speaking by SESSIONS, J., at p. 440 said:-
"Can the government, at least in the absence of specific legislative 
declaration to that effect, reach back years before the enactment of 
its revenue statute for a controlling factor in determining the net 
income of a corporation? Can it ignore a substantial increase in 
value of property, which has occurred and accrued prior to the tak-
ing effect of the tax law, and thereby convert into income that which 
is not income within any meaning of the term? To state these ques-
tions is to answer them".7 
In Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. United States, the Railway 
Company purchased stock in another company prior to January 1st, 
1909, and sold such stock at a profit subsequent to January 1st, 
1909. Held, that such profit was not "income" within the meaning 
of the corporation Excise Act of 1909, except to the extent that the 
selling price exceeded the market value on January l, 1909, but to 
that e."d:ent, the selling price constituted income, it appearing that 
the stock had a regular fixed stock market value. The court in this 
case follows the case of Gray v. Darlington modifying it, however, 
to the extent of holding that the increase in value of the stock which 
accrued subsequent to January l, 1909, the date when the law became 
effective, was taxable income.8 
CAsEs ARISING UNDER THE AcT OF OcToBER 3, 1913. 
In Lynch, Collector v. Turrish, supra, a corporation acquired cer-
tain property in 1903 which gradually increased in value for a 
period of years and was finally sold in 1914 at a large profit and the 
entire proceeds distributed as dividends to the stockholders in 1914. 
The facts in the case showed that no increase in value had accrued 
' Supra, note 4. 
• Supra, note 4. 
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after March 1st, 1913. It was held that the dividends so declared 
were not "income, gains or profits" within the meaning of the Act 
and, therefore, not taxable for the year 1914 because no income, 
gains or profits accrued to the stockholder during the year 1914 or 
after March 1, 1913 (the date of the incidence of the tax). 
The conclusion of the court is well stated in the syllabus in the 
following language :-"The enhanced value of property of a cor-
poration, which accrues from the gradual increase in its value dur-
ing a series of years prior to the effective date of an income tax law, 
although divided or distributed by dividend, or othenvise, subse-
quent to that date, does not become 'income, gains, or profits' taxable 
under such an act, but is rather an 'increase of capital assets' ".9 
In this case the court discusses the underlying principles involved 
in its decision in an intelligent and comprehensive way. The doc-
trine there laid down is undoubtedly the correct one to be applied in 
determining the taxability or non-taxability of profits from sales 
of property, or of dividends, with reference to the time of their 
accrual. To the same effect is Lynch v. Hornby, supra. 
It should be observed that in Lynch v. Turrish and in Lynch v. 
Hornby, there was actually a distribution as dividends to the stock-
holders of capital assets but this does not weaken the authority of 
the case as a precedent in support of the principle for which we are 
contending. The real point of the decision is that the increase in 
value of the property all accrued prior to March 1st, 1913. Had 
any part of such increase accrued subsequent to March 1st, 1913, 
then manifestly the court would have held such increase taxable. 
Suppose again that the property had been purchased subsequently to 
March 1st, 1913, then as is clearly implied in the case, the entire 
proceeds of the sale would not have been held to be capital assets 
but only the original cost price, and that part of the proceeds which 
represented the difference between the selling price and the original 
cost would have been taxable.9a 
In the case of Gulf Oil Company v. Lewellyn, Collec~or, supra, 
certain subsidiary companies of the plaintiff holding company de-
clared dividends in 1913 out of earnings, all of which accrued prior 
to January 1, 1913. All of the stock of the subsidiaries except 
directors' qualifying shares was owned by the plaintiff company. 
The Collector of Internal Revenue held that these dividends were 
taxable for the year 1913, against the parent company. The plain-
tiff paid the taxes under protest and brought this suit to recover the 
amount so paid, claiming that the income represented by dividends, 
• Supra, note 3. 
•• 2137, T. D. 2090. 
CORPORATE EARNINGS AS "INCOME" 237 
had not accrued to it subsequent to March l, 1913. The trial court 
sustained the contention of the plaintiff, relying on the case of 
Bailey v. Railroad Company, szipra.10 
The ourt after quoting at length from the Bailey Case proceeds 
as follows :-(p. 716). '"The foregoing seems to be a direct author-
ity in support of the contention of the plaintiff in the present case, 
for the language of the act of 1913 is no clearer in showing an intent 
of the lawmakers to tax earnings accrued prior to the time they were 
subjected to the operation of the act than was the language of the 
act of 1864. 'l'he argument that there should be a different con-
struction of the act of 1913 from that given to the act of 1864 is 
weakened by the fact that, at the time the earnings in the present 
case accrued, the authority given to Congress by the Sixteenth 
Amendment was wanting. (Italics oitrs). It seems to be perfectly 
clear that the advances in the value of property during a series of 
years can in no proper sense be considered gains, profits, or income 
of any one particular year of the series, although the entire amount 
of the advance may be at one time turned into money by the sale of 
the property". 
The Court then proceeds to discuss the cases of Lynch v. Turrish 
and Dy11ch v. Hornby, supra, and to subscribe to the doctrine therein 
laid down. The Court then continues, p. 716:-"The specific facts 
in each of those cases, (Lynch v. Tttrrish and Lynch v. Hornby) 
are not specially material. The complaints of the plaintiffs therein 
were generally the same as the complaint of the plaintiff in the pres-
ent case. Each had been assessed and compelled to pay a tax levied 
upon a distribution of assets, because of the mistaken view of the 
collector of internal revenue that such distribution of assets was 
'income, gains, or profits within the meaning of the Income Tax 
Law'". 
And again p. 716 :-"It is perhaps worthy of observation that 
Congress, being without authority to levy an income tax until 
February 25, 1913, when the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted, 
provided in Act 1913, par. G. (c) that the tax for that year should 
be upon the entire net income accrued within that portion of said 
year from March 1st, to December 31st, both dates inclusive, to be 
ascertained by taking five-sixths of the entire net income for said 
calendar year".11 
1' Supra, note 4. 
11 Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides "Representatives and direct taxes shall 
Le apportioned among the se·1eral states which may be included within this Union ac· 
cording to their respective numbers". Art 1, Sec. 8, "The Congress shall have power 
to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises " " ,. " but all duties, imposts and 
excises shall be uniform throughout the United States". Art. 1, Sec. g, "No capitation 
r,r other direct ta.x shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein 
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The Court summarizes its conclusion as follows :-"The dividends 
in question in this suit were not subject to the tax imposed, because 
they were a distribution of surplus earnings arising through a period 
of years, and which had accrued to, and the equitable ownership 
thereof was vested in, the plaintiff prior to January I, I9I3, and 
such earnings were not intended by Congress to be subject to taxa-
tion." 
DECISIONS CoN'tRA. 
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals reverses the District 
Court in the case last above discussed, holding that such dividends 
were taxable.12 In doing so the court followed the late case of 
.Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe.13 To the same effect is the 
case of Towne v. Eisner. We believe that the three last named cases 
are incorrectly decided.14 We shall consider them in the order in 
which they were decided. 
In the Lowe Case the facts were that the plaintiff a holding com-
pany owned all of the stock of certain subsidiary companies except 
directors' qualifying shares. The subsidiary companies in I9I4 de-
-dared certain dividends out of earnings, all of which accrued prior 
to July Ist, I909· The Collector of Internal Revenue assessed the 
Southern Pacific Company on these dividends for the first six 
months of the year I9I4. The taxes were paid under protest and 
this suit was then brought to recover the same. The Court, in hold-
ing that the dividends were taxable, attempts to draw certain dis-
tinctions which would serve to differentiate the case before it from 
};~fore directed to be taken". An income Tax Law was passed by Congress in 1861 to 
rrovide additional revenue during the Civil War period, Chap. 45, Secs. 49, 51; i.:z Stat. 
!.. 309. This Act as. amentled by various Acts continued in force until 1871, when it 
~:i..pired and was not re-enacted. The courts in passing on the constitutionality of the 
Act of 1861 and its amendments, held that nn income tax is not a direct tax, and that, 
"therefore, the Acts were not unconstitutional. Springer v. U. S.. 102 U. S. 586; Clark 
v. Sickel, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2862, 14 Int. Rev. Rec. 6; Smedberg v. Bentley, .:z.:z Fed. Cas. 
No. 12964, 21 Int. Rev. Rec. 38. However, that part of the Wilson Tariff Act of 189+ 
which undertook to impose ar. Income Tax, as stated in the text, was held unconstitu· 
tional by the Supreme Court of the United States, as being a direct ta.r in the case oi 
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429 (Rehearing 158 U. S. 601). 
In the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan on the rehearing (p. 638) in the Pollock 
cise, it is pointed out that a tax upon income derived from business operations er from 
the practice of a trade or profession, was not a direct tax, and that no apportionment 
among the states would be necessary in so far as a tax upon income is laid t•pon those 
subjects alone. However, all nice distinctions of this nature were wiped out and made 
ol no further importance by the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment which provides as 
follows :-"The Congress shall have -;iower to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived without apportionment among the several states, and without 
-regard to any census or emuneration,,. 
12 Lewellyn, Collector, v. Gulf Oil Corporation. Supra, note i. 
12 Supra, note .:z. 
•• Snpra, note .:z. 
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.earlier cases such as Gray v. Darlington and Lynch v. Turrish. The 
Court at p. 849 says :-"But how this surplus is made up, whether 
from earnings of the company or increase in value of land does not 
appear" and again, at p. 85 l :-"But nowhere does the testimony or 
statements warrant a finding that this surplus is an increase to cap-
ital by a year to year enhancement of the value of the capital of the 
railway company, and is not from any enhancement of the value of 
land or property of the corporation." _ 
The distinction is clearly not a valid one, the doctrine of Gray v. 
Darlington and of similar cases being broad enough to cover all 
forms of profits or increase in valuation accruing prior to the inci-
dence of the tax. The Court, however, to bolster up its decision 
advances the argument that (p. 850) :-"The government cannot 
tax undistributed surplus as income to the stockholders because they 
were (it was) income to the stockholder when paid and not before. 
While it may be that the plaintiff owning all of the capital stock of 
the Central Pacific Company could have begun some action to have 
disbursed the surplus, still it did not do so. The accumulation of 
surplus of itself does not entitle stockholders to dividends. * * *" 
"A stockholder has no interest in the profit of a corporation until 
a dividend has been declared." 
The answer to this contention is twofold. 
First-The statement that "the government cannot tax undistri-
buted surplus as income to the stockholders" is incorrect in view of 
the language of the Act of October 3, 1913, which expressly author-
izes the levying of the additional tax upon the interest which the 
individual shareholder would have in undistributed profits, if dis-
tributed, 15 and 
Secondly-The equitable beneficial interest in such undistributed 
profits is at all times vested in the individual stockholder who is 
entitled ultimately to receive them.16 The earnings of a corporation, 
the moment they are earned, enhance the value of the stock owned 
by its stockholders and accrue to the benefit of the stockholders even 
though not distributed until years later. 
Again the court relies on the case of Edwards v. Keith.11 But 
this case is clearly distinguishable since in the Edwards Case the 
contention was that insurance premiums paid over a period of 
years under a contract by which the agent was to receive a portion 
of such anni.ial premiums on all policies written by him, accrued 
during the year the policies were written and were therefore, not 
taxable in the year received. The court in the Edwards Case, how-
11 Subdivision 2 of Sec. 2, Act of October 3rd, 1913. 
10 Collector v. Hubbard (1870), 79 U. S. I, 18; Gulf Oil Corporatio11. v. Lewellyn, 
-Collector, Supra, note 3. 
1T Edwards v. Keith (1916), 231 Fed. no. 
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ever, overruled this contention and in doing so pointed out that the 
yearly premiums did not accrue when the policies were written and 
in fact might never have accrued since there was no assurance that 
the insured would pay these annual premiums. Plaintiff's commis-
sion on such premiums could, therefore, not be said to be vested, in 
the year the policies were taken out, in any sense of the word. In 
the Lowe Case, however, the situation is different. The dividends 
which were paid in 1914, were actually earned prior to July l, 1909, 
and the beneficial title thereto thereupon vested in the plaintiff. In 
other words the dividends accrued prior to July l, 1909. It may be 
true as the Court said (p. 852) that "financial reverses or some other 
calamity might have destroyed the surplus" before it was actually 
paid out as dividends, but this does not change the fact that such 
dividend funds were earned and had accrued prior to the incidence 
of the Income Tax Law of 1913. 
Towne v. Eisner: In this case the directors and stockholders of 
the Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, in December, 1913, 
voted a stock dividend in payment of a dividend out of earnings, all 
of which were earned prior to January lst, 1913. The share of the 
plaintiff Towne in such dividend ·was taxed under the Act of Oct-
ober 3, 1913. Following the usual procedure, the tax was paid 
under protest and this suit was brought to recover the same. The 
court held that the stock dividend was taxable.18 
In arriving at this conclusion the court relied on the case of 
Edwards v. Keith, s1tpra, which has already been distinguished and 
also the case of Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe which we have 
criticised, supra. 
The court further relies on the cases of Brushaber v. Union 
Pacific R.R. Co. and Van Dyke v. City of Milwaukee.1~ Neither 
of these cases supports the position of the court. It is true that the 
Briishhaber Case in passing on the constitutionality of the Act of 
October 3, 1913, held that that Act was constitutional even though 
it was retroactive to the extent of taxing incomes accruing at any 
time subsequent t6 March l, 1913, but the court had no occasion to . 
and did not pass upon the question of the right of the government 
to levy a tax retroactive in its operation to a point prior to the ef-
fective date of the Sixteenth Amendment. Indeed while the point 
now under c6nsideration was not involved in the Brushaber case, 
the language of the court in that case directly supports our conten-
tion. The Court at p. 20 speaking by Mr. Chief Justice \VH1T:r: 
says :-"But the date of the retroactivity did not extend beyond the 
11 Supra, note 2. 
11 Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. Co. (1916). 240 U. S. 1; Van Dyke v. City of 
Milwaukee (1915), 159 Wlis. 460. 
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time wh~n the Amendment was operative, and there can be no dis-
pute that there was power by virtue of the Amendment during that 
period to levy the tax, without apportionment, * '~ *" 
The Van Dyke Case is not in point since it arose under the state 
Income Tax Law of Wisconsin and it has never been doubted that 
a state can, if it sees fit, pass an income tax law, retroactive in its 
effect, the several states not being restricted in the passage of in-
come tax laws as was the Federal Government prior to the passage 
of the Sixteenth Amendment. The Eisner Case is to ·be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court of the United States on a writ of error.19" 
Coming now to the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the 
Gulf Oil Case the court in reversing the trial court attempts to 
distinguish the cases of Lynch v. Tiirrish and Lynch v. Hornby, 
supra, but with no better success than attended the efforts of the 
court in the Loew Case. The Court of Appeals ignores the reason-
ing of the trial court and the constitutional aspect of the case. 
In all three of the cases last discussed, the Lowe, Eisner and Gulf 
Oil Cases, the court rings the changes on the distinction between 
"income" and "capital assets" and attempts to distinguish Lynch v. 
Turrish, supra, and similar cases on that ground. While the dis-
tinction is often an important one it is not the controlling factor in 
these cases. The question is not as to the nature of the fund sought 
to be taxed whether income or capital but whether or not an income 
tax can be imposed on earnings accruing prior to the incidence of 
the tax. If the earnings accrued prior to the incidence of such tax, 
then they are not taxable, irrespective of whether the fund retains 
its status as income or has been merged into capital. 
To summarize the argument supporting the doctrine of Gray .v. 
Darlington and the cases which have followed it and rejecting the 
principles laid down in the Gulf Oil and similar cases : The Act of 
1913 provides for a levy of income tax only "upon the entire net 
income arising or accruing in the preceding calendar year".2D How-
ever, it may be conceded as suggested in the Bailey Case, supra, that 
it would be competent for Congress to pass an income tax law taxing 
a fund which had accrued during a preceding year, and Congress has 
in fact done so in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917, but this 
1"• After the above article was written but before going to press, the Supreme Court 
of the United States (January 7th, 1918) handed down its decision in the case of Towne 
v. Eisner, supra, reversing the trial court. The Supreme Court, however, bases its cie-
cision upon tbe sole ground that stock dividends arc not proper subjects of income 
taxation, the theory being that "'A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property 
of the corporation, and adds nothing to the interest of the shareholders. Its property is 
not diminished and their interests are not increased'." 
The Court quotes the above language from the case of Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 
1.'. s. 549. 
'"Sec. :: A., Subdivision I, Act of October 3rd, 1913. 
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retroactivity cannot extend to a date prior to the effective date of the 
Sixteenth Amendment. That Congress by the Act of 1913 did not 
intend and did not attempt to do this, is apparent from the language 
last above quoted from the Act and it is also apparent from the fur-
ther fact that a special provision is contained in that Act limiting the 
taxable income for that year to that which accrued subsequent to 
March 1, 1913, the date when the Act became operative.21 But in 
any event Congress could not, in z9z3, have legally passed an income 
tax law affecting income accruing in an earlier year. In other 
words, if prior to the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, Con-
gress did not have authority to lay a tax on income then it cannot, 
subsequent to the date of the Amendment, pass a law retroactive to 
a poi.llt prior thereto. 
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW 
In 1894, Congress in enacting the Wilson Tariff Act undertook to 
lay a tax on incomes.22 The following year the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the leading case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & 
Trust Company held the Act unconstitutional in so far as it applied 
to incomes derived from the renting of real property or from the 
investment of personal property.23 This decision resulted in the 
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States. Just as the decision in the Pollock Case, which was 
undoubtedly correct, created the necessity for the passage of the 
Sixteenth i\mendment as a condition precedent to the enactment of 
any valid income tax legislation, so the erroneous rulings of the 
Treasury Department, made it incumbent upon Congress to define 
specifically, "gains" and "dividends", with reference to the time of 
their accrual, so as to secure uniformity in the administration of the 
law. In doing so Congress no doubt took cognizance of the fact that 
February 25th, 1913, the effective date of the Sixteenth Amendment 
was the earliest date upon which the incidence of the ta~ could be 
fixed-that "gains, profits and income", accruing prior to that date 
could not be reached for purposes of income taxation. In view of 
the pressing needs of the Government for additional revenue, how-
ever, Congress no doubt desired to make the scope of the law as 
wide as possible and accordingly fixed on March lst, 1913, a few 
days after the taking effect of the Amendment, as the date of 
incidence. -
21 Par. G. (c), Act of October 3rd, 1913. 
"'Act of Congress, August 27th, 1894, 28 Stat. 509, e 349 . 
.. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company (1895), 157 U. S. 429, on rehearing 
158 u. s. 601. 
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Pursuant to this design we find in the Act of September 8th, 1916, 
the following definition of "gain";-
"For the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the sak 
or other disposition of property, real, personal or mixed, acquired 
before March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, the fair market 
price or value of such property as of March first, nineteen hundred 
and thirteen, shall be the basis for determining the amount of such 
gain derived".2"' 
This provision is not amended by the Act of October 3rd, 1917. 
As the law now is, therefore, the gain derived from the sale or other 
disposition of property acquired by a corporation prior to March 
1st, 1913, and sold subsequent thereto shall be determined by deduct-
ing from the selling price, the "fair market price or value" as of 
March 1st, 1913, even though the original purchase price was much 
less or much greater than the market price as of that date. 25 
As to property acquired subsequent to March 1st, 1913, there can 
also be no difficulty. Here the rule is that the gain from the sale of 
property acquired subsequent to March 1st, 1913, for the purpose of 
the Act shall be the difference between the selling price and the 
actual price paid for it together with the expense incident to the 
procurement of the property in the first instance, and its sale there-
after, plus the cost of improvement or development, if any. In de-
termining the cost of property for the purpose of arriving at the profit 
realized upon the sale it will be permissible for the corporation to add 
to the initial cost, such carrying charges as interest, taxes, insurance, 
.etc., provided such carrying charges have not been deducted from 
the net income returned for years subsequent to the incidence of the 
tax and prior to the date of the sale.26 
The entire "gain" as thus defined, is taxable in the year in which 
the property is sold or disposed of, and is not pro-rated even though 
the increase in value is a gradual accretion extending over a period 
of years. This is merely a way of saying that the law takes no 
cognizance of increase in valuations evidenced merely by book en-
tries. It only concerns itself with a completed, a closed transaction.27 
The term "dividends" is defined in the Act of September 8th, 1916, 
as follows: "Provided, that the term dividends as used in this title 
shall be held to mean any distribution made or ordered to be made 
by a corporation, joint-stock company, association- or insurance com-
"Sec. 2 (c), Act of September 8th, 1916. 
*'T. D. 2090. 
•T. D. 2137. 
'Z1 Baldwin Locomotive Works v. :McCoach (1915), 221 Fed. 59; United States v. 
-Guggenheim Exploration Co. (1917), 238 Fed. 231; T. D. 2185. 
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pany out of its earnings or profits accrued since March first, nine-
teen hundred and thirteen, and payable to its shareholders, whether 
in cash or in stock of the corporation, joint-stock company, associa-
tion or insurance company, which stock-dividend shall be considered 
income to the amount of its cash value."28 
This proviso or definition does not appear in the 1913 Act and 
like the definition of "gain" supra, was no doubt inserted in the 1916 
Act as a guide to and indeed a check against erroneous rulings in 
the future by the Treasury Department, and by the Courts such as 
those already referred to. But it should be noted that neither of the 
~wo provisions of the Act of 1916, last above referred to restricted 
the range of the tax. On the contrary they greatly enlarged it since 
under the Act of October 3rd, 1913, only "gains, profits or income" 
accruing diering the taxable year were properly taxable, whereas 
under the Act of September 8th, 1916, as it originally was, and also 
as amended, the taxable field is extended so as to embrace all "gains, 
profits or income" accruing subsequent to March 1st, 1913, and 
received in the taxable year. 
This conclusion is irresistible when we consider the above pro-
visions taken in conjunction with the radical difference in the open-
ing words of the 1913 Act and those of the Act of 1916, as amended. 
The earlier Act provides that, "There shall be levied, assessed and 
paid annually upon the entire net income arising or accrning from 
all sources ditring the preceding calendar year, to every corporation, 
etc." The language of the instant Act on the other hand is that 
"There shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid annually upon 
the total net income received in the preceding calendar year from all 
sources by every corporation." 
The case of Southern Pacific Company v. Lowe, supra, furnishes 
a remarkable instance of judicial oversight which strengthens the ar-
gument that that case is incorrectly decided. The Court in summing 
up its conclusion in that case uses the following language: "Since 
these dividenqs were received within the six months and 'were paid 
as part of the gross income to the plaintiff as a stockholder of the 
railroad company and were received ·within the year 'from all sourc-
es,' (Italics ours) I am of the opinion that the collector was right 
in levying this assessment and collecting this tax; and accordingly, 
there must be judgment directed for the defendant * * *''25 The 
words "were received within the year froni aU sources" do not ap-
pear at all in the Act of October 3rd, 1913, but are substituted in the 
.. Sec. :z (a), Act of September 8th, 1916. 
21• Supra, note :z at p. 853. 
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Act of September 8th, 1916, for the words "arising or accruing from 
all sottrces during the preceding calendar year'' which is the langauge 
of the Act of October 3rd, 1913. The change in the law is a vital 
one as will be readily seen by a simple illustration. The X Trust 
Company performed services for a client during the years 191 l and 
1912, for which it rendered a bill of $s,ooo.oo on January 1st, 1913, 
and received payment June 1st, 1913. No services are rendered in 
the year 1913 or after the incidence of the tax. No part of the 
$s,ooo.oo is taxable as income. The same services are rendered dur-
ing the years 1915 and 1916 and payment is received in 1916. The 
entire $s,ooo.oo is taxable as income in 1916, the year in which it is 
received. 
The Act of October 3rd, 1917, materially amended the Act of 
September 8th, 1916, in regard to dividends. Subdivision (b) of 
sub-section 31, is new and works a radical change in the law.29 
Prior to the passage of the amendment it was held by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue that a corporation might declare divi-
dends subsequent to March 1st, 1913, out of earnings earned prior 
to that date without having first distributed as dividends, "the most 
recently accumulated undivided profits or surplus" provided that the 
corporation should "specifically inform the stoc~holders that the 
dividends were declared and paid", out of surplus and profits ac-
crued prior to March 1st, 1913, and should make proper entries on 
the books of the corporation showing that fact. In this connection 
it was said by the Commissioner, that "it is immaterial to this office 
whether dividends are paid out of current earnings or surplus ac-
quired prior to March 1st, 1913."30 
All this has been changed by the amendment which specifically 
provides that any distribution to stockholders "shall be deemed to 
.. Subsec. 31 (b) of Sec. 1211, Act of September 8th, 1916, as amended by Act of 
October 3rd, 1917, on account of its importance is here set out in full and is as follows: 
"(b). Any distribution made to the shareholders or members of a corporation, 
joint·stock company, or association, or insurance company, in the year nineteen hundred 
and seventeen, or subsequent tax years, shall be deemed to have been made from the 
most recently accumulated undivided profits or surplus, and shall constitute a part of the 
annual income of the distributee for the year in which received, and shall he taxed to 
the distributee at the rates prescribed by law for the years in which such profits or sur· 
plus were accumulated by the corporation, joint·stock company, association, or insurance 
company, but nothing herein shall be construed as taxing any earnings or profits accrued 
prior to March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, but such earnings or profits may be 
distributed in stock dividends or otherwise, exempt :from the t;llt, after the distribution 
of earnings and profits accrued since March first. nineteen hundred and thirteen, has 
been made. This subdivision shall not apply to any distribution made prior to August 
sixth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, out of earnings or profits accrued prior to 
March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen." 
:ao Letter to Corporation Trust Company signed by Acting Commissioner David A. 
Gates, dated January 23rd, 1917. 
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have been made from the most recently accumulated undivided pro-
fits or surplus and shall constitute a part of the annual income of 
the distributee for the year in which received and shall be taxed to 
the distributee at the rate prescribed by law for the years in which 
such profits or siirplits were acrnmulated by the corporation but 
nothing herein shall be construed as taxing any earnings or profits 
accrued prior to March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, but such 
earnings or profits may be distributed in stock dividends or other-
wise exempt from the tax after the distribution of earnings and 
profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen has 
been made".81 
It follows, therefore, that all earnings or profits earned and ac-
cumulated subsequent to March 1st, 1913, must now first be dis-
tributed by a corporation, subject to be taxed in the hands of the 
stockholders. After this has been done then "gains, profits and in-
come" accruing prior to :March 1st, 1913, may be distributed to the 
stockholders as dividends and will be tax free. 82 
From what has already been said it is apparent that there is an 
important distinction between the method in which dividends ac-
~ing over a period of years and gains, profits and income of a cor-
poration, not distributed as dividends, accruing over a like period, 
are now taxed." In the case of dividends, while the .entire amount 
of the dividend is taxable in the year received, (subject to the limita-
tion that "gains, profits and income" accruing prior to March I, 1913, 
are not taxable at all) it may represent items earned over a series of 
years. in which event the several rates in force in the years in which 
such items were earned will apply.32• On the other hand gains or 
profits other than dividends, as for example, increases in value of 
land during a series of years or compensation for services extending 
over several years would be taxed in their entirety, in the year the 
gain or profit was received, at the rate of taxation in force that year. 
11 Supra, note 29 • 
.. Supra, note 29. 
ua The point is further illustrated by a late ruling of the Treasury Department:-
"Where a Non-resident Alien (Corporation) received a dividend in 1916 from a Domestic 
Corporation which was earned by the corporation partly in 1915 and partly in 1916, the 
tax to be withheld is :z per cent of the entire dividend," T. D. 2584. (Released for 
publication November 24th, 1917.) This ruling is correct under the Act of September 
8th, 1916, because the dividend was "received" in 1916 and the 1916 rate of :z per cent 
is applicable. The ruling would be incorrect as applied to a similar case arising under 
the Act of October 3rd, 1913, for the reason that only that part of the dividend "accruing'' 
during the taxable year would be taxable. But it should be noted further that the ruling 
would also be incorrect as to dividends paid in 1917, since under the Act of September 
8th, 1916, as amended by the Act of October 3rd, 1917, the dividend would be ap-
portioned, the part "accruing'' in 1915 being taxable at the rate for that year (1 per 
cent) and the part accruing in 1916 would be taxable at the :z per cent rate. 
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In the practical administration of the law, cases will no doubt arise 
in which it will be difficult to determine what is the "most recently 
accumulated undivided profits or surplus". The law specifically 
requires the paying corporation to give "information at the source" 
including the names and addresses of stockholders, and the number 
of shares owned by each, and the tax years and applicable amounts 
in which such dividends were earned in such form and manner as 
may be prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the 
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury."33 While not in terms 
required by the Act it would seem also to be the duty of the corpora-
tion or individual receiving the dividend to ascertain this information 
from the paying corporation and to make their returns accordingly. 
However, these are mere matters of detail. The important point is 
that Congress has definitely withdrawn from the field of income 
taxation, "gains, profits and income" accruing prior to March 1st, 
1913, and has also established a workable, and as we believe, equit-
able means of taxing corporate earnings accumulated subsequent 
to March 1st, 1913. 
Tm: RULE IN PARI MATE:RIA. 
The argument in support of our contention that the decisions 
reached in the Lowe, Gulf Oil and Eisner Cases are incorrect, is 
strengthened in view of the well established principle that acts in 
pari materia, that is, acts relating to the same general subject matter 
are to be construed together. "All the enactments of the same legis-
lature on the same general subject-matter are to be regarded as parts 
of one uniform system. Later statutes are considered as supple-
mentary or complementary to the earlier enactment. In the course 
of the entire legislative dealings with the subject we are to discover 
the progressive development of a uniform and consistent design or 
else the continued modification and adaptation of the original design 
to apply to changing conditions or circumstances. In the passage of 
each Act the legislative body must be supposed to have had in mind 
and in contemplation the existing legislation on the ·same subject 
and to have shaped its new enactment with reference thereto."34 
When we come to consider therefore the language of the Act of 
October 3, 1913, itself, and particularly that provision which limits 
for the year 1913 the taxable income to that income "accruing'' sub-
• Subscc. :z6 of Sec. 1210, Act of September 8th, 1916, as amended by Act of 
October 3rd, 1917. 
H Black, Interpretation of Laws, (:znd, ed.) pp. 332-334. 
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sequent to March I, 1913, and when we read these provisions in con-
junction with the language of the original Act of 1916, as 
amended by the Act of October 3, 1917, limiting taxable profits on 
sales of property and taxable dividends to those. accruing after 
March I, 1913, and permitting the distribution of earnings accrued 
prior to March Ist, 1913, as tax free dividends, the consistent de-
sign of Congress at all times to tax only those profits or dividends 
which accrue after the incidence of the tax to be levied is apparent: 
The d.ecisions in the Lowe, Eisner and Gulf Oil Cases are the 
more inexplicable, in that they were all handed down subsequent to 
September 8th, 1916, and while not arising under the Act of that 
date ~he definition of "dividends" therein contained limiting divi-
dends taxable as income to those accruing subsequent to March 1st, 
1913, should have had a great, if not controlling influence on the 
courts in construing the terms, "gains, profits and income" as used 
in the earlier Act. 
While disclaiming all desire or intention to be unduly critical, we 
believe the facts warrant the statement that the Treasury Depart-
ment quite consistently--or inconsistently-and the Federal Courts 
at times-notably in the Gulf Oil,· Eisner and Lowe Cases-in the 
administration of the income tax laws, have been disposed to _reverse 
the usual rule applicable to the construction of internal revenue laws 
in general, and specifically income tax laws, and to resolve all doubts 
against the taxpayer, and in favor of the Government. In this con-
nection the late case of Gould v. Gould is most pertinent. In that 
case the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking by Mr. Jus-
tice McREYNOI.DS said :-"In the futerpretation of statutes levying 
taxes it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by im-
plication, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge 
their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed 
out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the 
government and in favor of the citizen."35 
It i~ perhaps pertinent to note that while income taxation has for 
many years in England and other countries been a constant and sub-
stantial source of revenue, until a comparatively recent time there 
has been a marked aversion by the American people to any form of 
income tax. That a present necessity for income taxation in this 
country exists and that such necessity will be a continuing one, 
seems certain. It would, therefore, be most inadvisable and im-
politic for the Treasury Department and the courts to insist on a 
""Gould v. Gould (1917, 38 Sup. Ct. 53. 
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theory of administration of our income tax system which would 
exact the last pound of flesh from the already over burdened tax-
payer .35 
Detroit, Michigan. 
RoBitRT M. DRYSDALE, 
MAURICE C. McG1FF1N, 
•While the decisions of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals are ordinarily 
final ;n income tax casP.s (Sec. 128. Judicial Code. 36 Stat. at L. 1133. Comp. St. 19n, 
p. 193), if the views above expressed are correct then it would seen to follow that there 
is a constitutional question involved in the case of Lewellyn, Collector v. Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion and similar cases entitling the tax payers to have the cases reviewed by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
The writer has been advised unoflicially by the Clerk of the United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Third District that an application for a writ of certiorari to 
the Supreme Court has been or is to be made in the case of Lewellyn v. Gulf Oil Cor-
poration, supra. 
